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Abstract
In the paper I prove that there are two squares of opposition. The
unconventional one is built up for synthetic propositions. There a, i
are contrary, a, o (resp. e, i) are contradictory, e, o are subcontrary,
a, e (resp. i, o) are said to stand in the subalternation.
1 Introduction
Since Aristotle the best known logical pattern has been presented by square
of opposition. However, since Kant and Rickert many philosophers have
paid attention that this square does not satisfy synthetic propositions. In
this paper we are proving that there are two squares of opposition under
following assumptions:
• we have the Boolean complement;
• synthetic propositions cannot be reduced to manipulations with Venn
diagrams, because they do not suppose including relations.
2 The short history of the square of opposi-
tion
Aristotle proposed the following four oppositions: contradiction, contrariety,
relation, and privation (Categories, Chapter 10, Metaphysics, Book I) that
semantically underlay the square of opposition:
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We must next explain the various senses in which the term ‘op-
posite’ is used. Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i)
as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another,
(iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives
(Cathegories, 10).
Aristotle himself described relations of the square of opposition to repre-
sent singular expressions (Prior Analytics, Chapter 46), see figure 1. He had
an intuition that quantifiers (both universal and existential ones) satisfy the
semantic relations of the square, too:
An affirmation is opposed to a denial in the sense which I denote
by the term ‘contradictory’, when, while the subject remains the
same, the affirmation is of universal character and the denial is
not. The affirmation ‘every man is white’ is the contradictory of
the denial ‘not every man is white’, or again, the proposition ‘no
man is white’ is the contradictory of the proposition ‘some men
are white’. But propositions are opposed as contraries when both
the affirmation and the denial are universal, as in the sentences
‘every man is white’, ‘no man is white’, ‘every man is just’, ‘no
man is just (On Interpretation, 7).
S is P S isn’t not-P
S is not-P S is not P
Figure 1: Aristotle’s square of opposition.
However, for the first time, Apuleius explicitly claimed that quantified
propositions satisfy the square. He wrote a short book, the Peri Hermeneias
2
[2], about logic that was used for centuries in teaching. This book is the
most famous in the history of logic for including the first appearance of the
square of opposition, the best known logical schema for the pedagogic purpose
[2]. He considered the four oppositions: contrary, subcontrary, contradic-
tory, subalternation. First, he described that the two incongruae (contrary)
propositions, on the left and right sides of the top of the square, never can be
true at the same time and nonetheless are sometimes false at the same time.
For example, when some pleasures are good, both universal propositions are
false at the same time, since it is impossible that every pleasure is both a
good and not a good. The two propositions along the bottom line (i.e. the
mirror-image of the contrary) are called subpares (subcontrary). They are
never false at the same time, but they can be true at the same time. Hence,
to confirm that some pleasure is a good we cannot use an argument that
some other pleasure is not a good. Further, we pair together the alterutrae
(contradictory) propositions, if we add a negation to each of the pair of al-
ternates, e.g. not every pleasure is a good means that some pleasure is not a
good. Finally, the subalternation appears between universal and particular
propositions, when the universal implies the particular, e.g. if every pleasure
is a good, then some pleasure is a good.
The meaning of propositions that satisfy the square of opposition can be
checked on Venn diagrams. Recall that a Venn diagram is an ellipse that
designates an extent of a concept A, i.e. a class of all real things that are
denoted by A. These things are called denotations. By assumption, all inner
points of ellipse designate appropriate real things. For instance, ‘every man is
mortal’ is a true proposition, because the Venn diagram of ‘man’ is included
into the Venn diagram of ‘the mortal being’ (i.e. all denotations of ‘man’
occur among denotations of ‘the mortal being’).
Kant first paid attention that there exists a true universal proposition like
‘all bodies are heavy’ such that Venn diagrams of its subject and predicate
do not assume the including relation. So, the Venn diagram of ‘body’ just
intersects the Venn diagram of ‘heavy’:
In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predi-
cate is thought . . . , this relation is possible in two different ways.
Either the predicate to the subject A, as something which is
(covertly) contained in this concept A; or outside the concept
A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the
one case I entitle the judgment analytic, in the other synthetic.
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Analytic judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the
connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through
identity; those in which this connection is thought without iden-
tity should be entitled synthetic (. . . ) If I say, for instance, ‘All
bodies are extended ’, this is an analytic judgment. For I do not
require to go beyond the concept which I connect with ‘body ’ in
order to find extension as bound up with it . . . The judgment is
therefore analytic. But when I say, ‘All bodies are heavy ’, the
predicate is something quite different from anything that I think
in the mere concept of body in general; and the addition of such
a predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgment.
Judgments of experience, as such, are one and all synthetic. For
it would be absurd to found an analytic judgment on experience.
Since, in framing the judgment, I must not go outside my concept,
there is no need to appeal to the testimony of experience in its
support [4].
Thus, in Kant’s opinion, only analytic judgments satisfy the square of
opposition. For synthetic judgments Venn diagrams lose any sense and, as a
result, we cannot apply the square for them. In Aristotelian logic there is the
inverse relation between content (class of all connotations) and extent (class
of all denotations) of a concept. By continuing the Kant’s ideas, Heinrich
Rickert claimed that for synthetic judgments (propositions) there is the direct
relation between content and extent of a concept. Therefore we cannot use
Venn diagrams there at all.
Thus, according to Kant and Rickert, there are two logics (the Aristotelian
for analytic propositions, where we can use Venn diagrams and the square
of opposition, and the non-Aristotelian for synthetic propositions without
Venn diagrams manipulations). This distinction entails another distinction
(proposed first by Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert) between two
kinds of sciences: natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and cultural sci-
ences (Geisteswissenschaften). In the first the Aristotelian logic is used by
applying a nomothetic approach, in the second the non-Aristotelian by ap-
plying an idiographic approach. The idiographic approach is concerned with
individual phenomena, as in biography and much of history, while its oppo-
site, the nomothetic approach, aims to formulate laws as general propositions.
In the history as in an individualizing science (eine individualisierende
Wissenschaft) we obtain the direct relation between content and extent of
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historical concepts: the more general historical concept is more value relevant
at the same time:
It obviously remains true that in characterizing one part of his-
torical activity, we can speak of a re-creative understanding of
the “spiritual” [der geistigen] world. But the concepts of un-
derstanding and re-creation are also too imprecise and general
to provide a fully autonomous and exhaustive characterization
of the nature of all historical representation. As regards under-
standing, it is important, first, that the object of understanding
in history is always something more than merely real; namely, it
is value relevant and meaningful. And second, to remain within
the domain of history, the value relevant and the meaningful are
comprehended not in a generalizing fashion but in an individu-
alizing fashion, even though their content may be only relatively
historical. Finally, even the concept of the “re-creation” of histor-
ical individuality acquires its precise significance for the theory
of the historical sciences only on the basis of the concept of the
individualizing understanding of meaning [10].
Any goodness will be crowned Some goodness will be crowned
No goodness will be crowned Some goodness will not be crowned
Figure 2: An example of the square of opposition for individualizing propo-
sitions.
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Under these conditions, the general does not imply the particular. For
instance, as we saw, we cannot differ the universal proposition ‘all bodies are
heavy’ from the particular one ‘some bodies are heavy’ by Venn diagrams,
because the extents of their concepts (the extents of ‘bodies’ and ‘heavy’)
are just intersected.
Rickert did not think of creating a new square of opposition that may
become suitable for describing semantic oppositions between synthetic (his-
torical, individualizing) propositions. If we set up such a problem, we will
start in distinguishing between general and particular synthetic propositions.
For analytic propositions while we move from the general (i.e. the con-
cept with the larger extent and the smaller content) to the particular (i.e.
the concept with the smaller extent and the larger content), we are losing
definiteness and certainty. For synthetic propositions, the general and the
particular are two different points of view, because both have different ex-
tents and different contents with the same certainty, which satisfy a direct
relation between them.
In the Apuleian square of opposition there is a duality between the general
and the particular. Indeed, for the general there is a contrary negation and for
the particular a subcontrary negation, thereby the contrary negation tends
to be maximized and the subcontrary negation tends to be minimized. In
the new square of opposition (see figure 2) we could propose another duality
that takes place between the affirmation and the negation. In this case the
contrary negation holds between the general affirmative proposition and the
particular affirmative proposition and the subcontrary negation between the
general negative proposition and the particular negative proposition.
In next sections we are formally proving that there exist two squares
of opposition and, correspondingly, two syllogistics (the first for analytic
propositions and the second for synthetic propositions).
3 Synthetic syllogictics
In Aristotle’s syllogistics, analytic propositions in Kant’s words are formal-
ized. In such propositions, a subject is thought within a predicate, the more
common concept, for example: ‘Socrates is a man’ or ‘All people are ani-
mals ’. Therefore the predicate in formulas SaP (‘every S is P ’), SiP (‘some
S are P ’), SeP (‘no S is P ’), SoP (‘some S are not P ’) may be replaced by
nouns, but not by adjectives. In other words, we have the following gram-
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mar: ‘noun 1 (subject) + is + noun 2 (predicate)’, and the concept of ‘noun
1’ is a kind (particular) of the concept of ‘noun 2’, i.e. ‘noun 2’ is thought as
general for ‘noun 1’.
However, how far can we consider propositions like ‘Socrates is white’,
‘All bodies are heavy’ within a conventional syllogistics formalizing just an-
alytic propositions? At the first blush, these troubles might be deleted if we
transformed an appropriate adjective into a noun. For example, the propo-
sition ‘Socrates is white’ may be converted to the proposition ‘Socrates is a
white being’, and ‘All bodies are heavy’ to ‘All bodies are something heavy’.
However, such a transformation does not solve our problem, because the
predicate is not general for the subject still. Thus, Socrates’ whiteness is not
his substantial attribute and the general of bodies is space, but not weight.
Any body is thought first as space entity.
For the first time, Aristotle noticed that there are propositions that have
been called synthetic since Kant and these propositions cannot be used in syl-
logistics. Aristotle’s counterexample was as follows: “He who sits, writes and
Socrates is sitting, then Socrates is writing” (Topics 10). This wrong syllo-
gism was caused by using synthetic propositions. Kant’s key example of syn-
thetic propositions: ‘All bodies are heavy’. They have the following grammar:
‘noun 1 (subject) + is + adjective (attribute)’. The connective ‘. . . is . . . ’
of synthetic propositions is understood in this paper as follows: A is B ≡
(∃C(C is A)∧∀C∀D((C is A∧D is A)⇒ C is D)∧∀C(C is A∧C is B)).
This understanding corresponds to the Kantian-Rickertian approach.
Assume that all the syllogistic synthetic propositions have the following
meaning:
• ‘All S are P ’ (‘All bodies are heavy’): there exist A such that A is S
or for any A, A is S and A is P ;
• ‘Some S are P ’ (‘Socrates is white’): there exist A such that ‘A is S’
is false, but ‘A is P ’ is true;
• ‘No S are P ’ (‘No bodies are angels’): there exist A such that ‘A is P ’
is false or ‘A is S’ is true;
• ‘Some S are not P ’ (‘Socrates is not black’): for any A, ‘A is S’ is false
and there exist A such that ‘A is P ’ is false or ‘A is S’ is false.
Let us propose now the syllogistic system formalizing synthetic proposi-
tions. This system is said to be synthetic syllogistics, while we are assuming
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that Aristotelian syllogistic is analytic. The basic logical connectives of syn-
thetic syllogistic are as follows: a (‘every + noun + is + adjective’), i (‘some
+ noun + is + adjective’), e (‘no + noun + is + adjective’) and o (‘some
+ noun + is not + adjective’) that are defined in synthetic ontology in the
following way:
SaP := (∃A(A is S) ∨ (∀A(A is P ∧A is S))); (1)
SiP := ∀A(A is P ∧ ¬(A is S)); (2)
SoP := ¬(∃A(A is S) ∨ (∀A(A is P ∧A is S))), i.e.
(∀A¬(A is S) ∧ ∃A(¬(A is P ) ∨ ¬(A is S))); (3)
SeP := ¬∀A(A is P ∧ ¬(A is S)), i.e. ∃A(¬(A is P ) ∨ (A is S)). (4)
Now let us formulate axioms of synthetic syllogistics:
SaP ⇒ SeP ; (5)
SoP ⇒ PoS; (6)
(MaP ∧ SaM)⇒ SaP ; (7)
(MaP ∧ SeM)⇒ SeP. (8)
In synthetic syllogistics we have a novel square of opposition that we call
the synthetic square of opposition (see figure 3), where the following theorems
are inferred: SaP ⇒ ¬(SoP ), ¬(SoP ) ⇒ SaP , SiP ⇒ ¬(SeP ), ¬(SeP ) ⇒
SiP , SeP ⇒ ¬(SiP ), ¬(SiP ) ⇒ SeP , SoP ⇒ ¬(SaP ), ¬(SaP ) ⇒ SoP ,
SaP ⇒ ¬(SiP ), SiP ⇒ ¬(SaP ), ¬(SeP ) ⇒ SoP , ¬(SoP )⇒ SeP , SaP ⇒
SeP , SiP ⇒ SoP , SeP ∨ SiP , ¬(SeP ∧ SiP ), SaP ∨ SoP , ¬(SaP ∧ SoP ),
¬(SaP ∧ SiP ), SeP ∨ SoP .
4 Non-Archimedean models of Aristotelian
syllogistics and synthetic syllogistics
Suppose B is a complete Boolean algebra with the bottom element 0 and
the top element 1 such that the cardinality of its domain |B| is an infinite
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SaP SiP
SeP SoP
Figure 3: The synthetic square of opposition (for synthetic syllogistics, where
synthetic propositions are formalized).
number. Build up the set BB of all functions f : B 7→ B. The set of all
complements for finite subsets of B is a filter and it is called a Freche´t filter,
it is denoted by U . Further, define a new relation ≈ on the set BB by
f ≈ g = {a ∈ B : f(a) = g(a)} ∈ U . It is easily proved that the relation ≈
is an equivalence. For each f ∈ BB let [f ] denote the equivalence class of f
under ≈. The ultrapower BB/U is then defined to be the set of all equivalence
classes [f ] as f ranges over BB. This ultrapower is called a nonstandard (or
non-Archimedean) extension of Boolean algebra B, for more details see [8]
and [12]. It is denoted by ∗B.
There exist two groups of members of ∗B: (1) functions that are constant,
e.g. f(a) = m ∈ B on the set U , a constant function [f = m] is denoted by
∗m, (2) functions that are not constant. The set of all constant functions of
∗B is called standard set and it is denoted by ◦B. The members of ◦B are
called standard. It is readily seen that B and ◦B are isomorphic.
We can extend the usual partial order structure on B to a partial order
structure on ◦B:
1. for any members x, y ∈ B we have x ≤ y in B iff ∗x ≤ ∗y in ◦B,
2. each member ∗x ∈ ◦B\{∗0} (i.e. that is not a bottom element ∗0 of ◦B)
is greater than any number [f ] ∈ ∗B\◦B, i.e. ∗x > [f ] for any x ∈ B,
where [f ] is not constant function,
3. ∗0 is the bottom element of ∗B.
Notice that under these conditions, there exist the top element ∗1 ∈ ∗B
such that 1 ∈ B and the bottom element ∗0 ∈ ∗B such that 0 ∈ B.
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The ordering conditions mentioned above have the following informal
sense: (1) the sets ◦B and B have isomorphic order structure; (2) the set
∗B\{∗0} contains actual infinities that are less than any member of ◦B\{∗0}.
These members are called Boolean infinitesimals.
Introduce three operations ‘sup’, ‘inf’, ‘¬’ in the partial order structure
of ∗B:
inf([f ], [g]) = [inf(f, g)];
sup([f ], [g]) = [sup(f, g)];
¬[f ] = [¬f ].
This means that a nonstandard extension ∗B of a Boolean algebra B pre-
serves the least upper bound ‘sup’, the greatest lower bound ‘inf’, and the
complement ‘¬’ of B.
Consider the member [h] of ∗B such that {a ∈ B : h(a) = f(¬a)} ∈ U .
Denote [h] by [f¬]. Then we see that inf([f ], [f¬]) ≥ ∗0 and sup([f ], [f¬]) ≤
∗1. Really, we have several cases.
1. Case 1. The members ¬[f ] and [f¬] are incompatible. Then inf([f ],
[f¬]) ≥ ∗0 and sup([f ], [f¬]) ≤ ∗1,
2. Case 2. Suppose ¬[f ] ≥ [f¬]. In this case inf([f ], [f¬]) = ∗0 and
sup([f ], [f¬]) ≤ ∗1.
3. Case 3. Suppose ¬[f ] ≤ [f¬]. In this case inf([f ], [f¬]) ≥ ∗0 and
sup([f ], [f¬]) = ∗1.
4. Case 4. The members [f ] and ¬[f¬] are incompatible. Then inf(¬[f ],
¬[f¬]) ≥ ∗0 and sup(¬[f ],¬[f¬]) ≤ ∗1,
5. Case 5. Suppose ¬[f¬] ≥ [f ]. In this case inf(¬[f ],¬[f¬]) ≥ ∗0 and
sup(¬[f ],¬[f¬]) = ∗1.
6. Case 6. Suppose ¬[f¬] ≤ [f ]. In this case inf(¬[f ],¬[f¬]) = ∗0 and
sup(¬[f ],¬[f¬]) ≤ ∗1.
7. Case 7. The members ¬[f¬] and ¬[f ] are incompatible. Then inf([f ],
¬[f¬]) ≥ ∗0 and sup([f ],¬[f¬]) ≤ ∗1,
8. Case 8. Suppose ¬[f ] ≥ ¬[f¬]. In this case inf([f ],¬[f¬]) = ∗0 and
sup([f ],¬[f¬]) ≤ ∗1.
10
9. Case 9. Suppose ¬[f ] ≤ ¬[f¬]. In this case inf([f ],¬[f¬]) ≥ ∗0 and
sup([f ],¬[f¬]) = ∗1.
10. Case 10. The members [f ] and [f¬] are incompatible. Then inf(¬[f ],
[f¬]) ≥ ∗0 and sup(¬[f ], [f¬]) ≤ ∗1,
11. Case 11. Suppose [f¬] ≥ [f ]. In this case inf(¬[f ], [f¬]) ≥ ∗0 and
sup(¬[f ], [f¬]) = ∗1.
12. Case 12. Suppose [f¬] ≤ [f ]. In this case inf(¬[f ], [f¬]) = ∗0 and
sup(¬[f ], [f¬]) ≤ ∗1.
Definition 1 Now define hyperrational valued matrix logic MB as the or-
dered system 〈∗B, {∗1},¬,⇒,∨,∧〉, where
1. ∗B is the set of truth values,
2. {∗1} is the set of designated truth values,
3. for all [x] ∈ ∗B, ¬[x] = ∗1− [x],
4. for all [x], [y] ∈ ∗B, [x]⇒ [y] = ∗1− sup([x], [y]) + [y],
5. for all [x], [y] ∈ ∗B, [x] ∧ [y] = inf([x], [y]),
6. for all [x], [y] ∈ ∗B, [x] ∨ [y] = sup([x], [y]).
Proposition 1 In MB there are only two squares of opposition.
Proof. We have just eight cases: (1) [f ] ≤ [f¬], (2) [f ] ≤ ¬[f¬], (3) [f¬] ≤
[f ], (4) [f¬] ≤ ¬[f ], (5) ¬[f¬] ≤ [f ], (6) ¬[f¬] ≤ ¬[f ], (7) ¬[f ] ≤ [f¬], (8)
¬[f ] ≤ ¬[f¬]. Taking into account that couples [f ] and ¬[f ] ([f¬] and ¬[f¬])
are contradictory, we can claim that there exist two squares of opposition:
• if [f¬] ≤ [f ] (resp. ¬[f ] ≤ ¬[f¬]), we have the conventional square of
opposition (see figure 4); if ¬[f¬] ≤ [f ] (resp. ¬[f ] ≤ [f¬]), we have
its dual without changing meaning;
• if [f ] ≤ ¬[f¬] (resp. [f¬] ≤ ¬[f ]), we have the synthetic square of
opposition (see figure 5); if ¬[f¬] ≤ [f ] (resp. ¬[f ] ≤ [f¬]), we have
its dual without changing meaning. ✷
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[f ] [f¬]
¬[f¬] ¬[f ]
Figure 4: In case [f¬] ≤ ¬[f ], the square of oppositions for any members [f ],
[f¬], ¬[f ], ¬[f¬] of ∗B holds true, i.e. [f ], [f¬] are contrary, [f ],¬[f ] (resp.
¬[f¬], [f¬]) are contradictory, ¬[f¬],¬[f ] are subcontrary, [f ],¬[f¬] (resp.
[f¬],¬[f ]) are said to stand in the subalternation.
Now we can build models for atomic syllogistic formulas (i.e. syllogistic
formulas without propositional connectives) due to algebra MB.
Definition 2 A structure B = 〈O, I, a˙, e˙, i˙, o˙, a˙, e˙, i˙, o˙〉 is a non-
Archimedean syllogistic model iff:
1. O is a restriction of the set MB to an appropriate square (triangle) of
opposition (thereby the conventional square of opposition should hold
true for Aristotelian syllogistics and the synthetic square of opposition
holds for synthetic syllogistics).
2. I is a mapping that associates a class of equivalence [f ] ∈ O with each
atomic syllogistic formula S ⋄ P , where ⋄ ∈ {a, e, i, o, a, e, i, o}, so
that I(S ⋄ P ) = |S|⋄˙|P |, where ⋄˙ ∈ {a˙, e˙, i˙, o˙, a˙, e˙, i˙, o˙} and
• |S|a˙|P | = [f ] (resp. |S|a˙|P | = ¬[f¬]);
• |S|e˙|P | = [f¬] (resp. |S|e˙|P | = ¬[f ]);
• |S|i˙|P | = ¬[f¬] (resp. |S|i˙|P | = [f ]);
• |S|o˙|P | = ¬[f ] (resp. |S|o˙|P | = [f¬]);
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[f ] ¬[f¬]
[f¬] ¬[f ]
Figure 5: In case ¬[f¬] ≤ ¬[f ], the synthetic square of oppositions for
any members [f ], [f¬], ¬[f ], ¬[f¬] of ∗B holds true, i.e. [f ],¬[f¬] are con-
trary, [f ],¬[f ] (resp. ¬[f¬], [f¬]) are contradictory, ¬[f ], [f¬] are subcon-
trary, [f ], [f¬] (resp. ¬[f¬],¬[f ]) are said to stand in the subalternation.
• |S|a˙|P | = [f ] (resp. |S|a˙|P | = ¬[f¬]);
• |S|e˙|P | = [f¬] (resp. |S|e˙|P | = ¬[f ]);
• |S|i˙|P | = ¬[f¬] (resp. |S|i˙|P | = [f ]);
• |S|o˙|P | = ¬[f ] (resp. |S|o˙|P | = [f¬]).
We now give the truth conditions of Boolean combinations of atomic
syllogistic formulas in a non-Archimedean syllogistic model:
Definition 3
B  ¬φ iff B 2 φ
B  φ ∧ ψ iff B  φ and B  ψ
B  φ ∨ ψ iff B  φ or B  ψ
B  φ⇒ ψ iff B  ¬φ or B  ψ
5 Conclusion
In this paper using non-Archimedean models I have just proved that there are
only two squares of opposition if we assume Boolean algebra as the basis of an
appropriate non-Archimedean extension. The conventional square of opposi-
tion may be aimed for getting analytic syllogistics (Aristotelian syllogistics)
and the new one for getting synthetic syllogistics (syllogistics, proposed in
this paper).
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